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INTRODUCTION
The benefits of our public education system are supposed to be
equally available to all those who choose to partake in it. However, American
elementary and secondary school students have dramatically different
educational experiences depending on the school in which they are enrolled.
This raises an important question: where should we look to determine where
any inequalities might lie?
Comparisons across our system of public education can be made in
three ways: across states, across districts within a state, and within districts.
Because states are afforded much deference on issues of public education,
comparisons of inequalities across states are uncommon, and not particularly
useful. Most of the attention has been on interdistrict comparisons—
measuring equality between and among school districts located within a
particular state, facilitated by the use of the relevant provision of the state
constitution as a starting point to offset unevenness between districts.

*
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However, in most school systems, there is also some degree of
intradistrict inequality, between and among schools in the same district, with
the consequences of those inequalities felt most by schools in high-poverty
geographic areas that tend to be lower-performing. Once wealthier
neighborhood schools leverage this resource advantage, the gap widens even
further, in terms of both financial and human resources.
This raises several questions. Why is intradistrict inequality so rarely
part of the conversation about inequality? In what areas are these inequalities
most likely to manifest? And how might we start thinking about how to
address these problems within a given district?
In thinking about these important questions, one answer has become
clear: in order to remedy inequalities in the public education system—in
order to meaningfully reform the education system on a legal and policy
level—we have to talk more about inequalities within districts than we
presently do. Presently, there are inequalities within school districts that are
real, growing, and, in some instances, further exacerbated by synergies
between them. Such inequalities are expanding deeper into states away from
urban areas, as a result of changing demographics in both urban and suburban
communities. And if we do not look specifically at what’s going on within
districts, some of these inequalities can be masked by broader equalizing
forces among districts.
This Article discusses five different factors that contribute to
inequalities within school districts. Part I addresses each of these in turn:
school segregation; resource inequalities; gaps in private fundraising; school
district secession; and the limitations of school choice. Taken together, these
factors suggest that intradistrict inequalities create a complicated and
difficult problem to solve. It is therefore imperative that if we are going to
talk about education reform at the intersection of law, policy, and politics,
we need to also talk specifically about intradistrict inequalities. Part II thus
considers initial steps that might be taken to begin to eliminate some of these
inequalities.
I.

INEQUALITIES WITHIN DISTRICTS

There are many ways to make comparisons across the education
system. For example, we often compare states across many categories,
allowing us to make ranked lists of expenditures, performance, or allocation
of resources. Such lists can potentially reveal educational inequalities across
different states, but are ineffective mechanisms for offsetting inequalities for
two related reasons—the lack of a federal constitutional right to an education
and the deference given to states on most education issues.1
Most often, when making comparisons to determine where
inequalities might lie, we compare districts within a state. According to the
1.

See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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2012 United States Census of Governments, there are more than 14,000
school districts across the country.2 Most of these do not correspond to city,
town, or county lines.3 These school districts enrolled approximately 50.7
million students in public elementary and secondary schools in the fall of
2017.4
It is not surprising that in such a diverse system, inequalities exist.
Comparisons between districts are more fruitful than those made between
states, because state constitutional guarantees can be used to argue that such
inequalities should not exist. However, remedying inequalities between
districts can mask the inequalities that persist within them. There cannot be
meaningful education reform without consideration of sources of inequality
within school districts.
What follows is a discussion of five factors, problems, and policies
that contribute and relate to intradistrict inequalities: school segregation,
resource inequalities, fundraising disparities, school district secession, and
school choice. Each factor is important to understand, as is the idea that
synergies between them mean that existing inequalities are likely to grow if
they are not addressed. Each factor is also worthy of more in-depth discussion
than is possible to address in this Essay—instead, the following discussion is
meant as a survey for symposium participants who may have varying
amounts of familiarity with these issues and only skims the surface of the
underlying principles and consequent effects.
A.

The persistent problem of school segregation

More than sixty years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown
v. Board of Education, many students in the United States attend schools that
are far from “integrated.”5 In fact, many students attend schools that face
“double segregation”—segregated both by both race and poverty.6 The
persistent problem of school segregation has many effects, some that are
tangible, and others less so. And the problem thrives both in areas where
schools were segregated by law and those that were not (at least not literally
so). Schools that were segregated by law tend to resegregate when released
2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LISTS & STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENTS, POPULATIONS OF
INTEREST: SCHOOL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS (2016)
[hereinafter Public School Systems], https://www.census.gov/govs/go/school_govs.html.
3. Richard Briffault, The Local School District in American Law, at 3 (2003),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/pepg/PDF/events/SBConfPDF/papers/PEPG_0302Briffault.pdf.
4. Back to School Statistics, NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STAT.,
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372. An additional 5.2 million students were
expected to enroll in private elementary and secondary schools in the fall of 2017.
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. See generally Gary Orfield et al., E Pluribus . . . Separation: Deepening Double
Segregation for More Students, C.R. PROJECT (Sept. 2012), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu
/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/mlk-national/e-pluribus . . . separationdeepening-double-segregation-for-more-students.
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from court-ordered mandates to integrate.7 In other areas, neighborhood
schools are often segregated by default because they are a reflection of
residential neighborhood segregation.8
In the years following the Court’s mandate to desegregate the
schools (eventually “with all deliberate speed”),9 states, school districts, and
schools found ways to resist before eventually being forced to comply. 10
School integration in the south hit its highest levels in 1988, which is
somewhere about mid-range between Brown and the present day.11 At that
point, 43.5% of southern black students attended majority white southern
schools.12 By 2011, the percentage had dropped to 23.2%.13
Why might this be? The Court has systematically chipped away at
Brown since the 1970s.14 Twenty years after its decision in Brown, the Court
struck down Detroit’s integration-by-busing plan and held that integration
plans could not cross district lines absent proof of an interdistrict violation.15
Urban school districts were thus left to deal with the task of desegregation,
while at the same time white flight to the suburbs left cities with difficult
problems such as decaying schools and increasing crime.16
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Court turned to lifting
desegregation orders for school districts that met certain criteria.17 Between
1990 and 2009, courts released 45% of school districts from their

7. Sean F. Reardon et al., Brown Fades: The End of Court-Ordered Desegregation
and the Resegregation of American Public Schools, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. (NO. 4)
876, 877 (2012).
8. Richard Rothstein, The Racial Achievement Gap, Segregated Schools, and
Segregated Neighborhoods—A Constitutional Insult, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.epi.org/publication/the-racial-achievement-gap-segregated-schools-andsegregated-neighborhoods-a-constitutional-insult/ (“Certainly, Northern schools have not
been segregated by policies assigning blacks to some schools and whites to others – at least
not since the 1940s; they are segregated because their neighborhoods are racially
homogenous.”).
9. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. Of Topeka (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
10. See generally Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown:
Understanding and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated
School, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787, 811-37 (2010).
11. Gary Orfield, et al., Brown at 60: Great Progress, A Long Retreat and an
Uncertain Future, C.R. PROJECT 1, 9-10 (May 2014), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu
/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-longretreat-and-an-uncertain-future/Brown-at-60-051814.pdf.
12. Id. at 10.
13. Id.
14. See generally Robinson, supra note 10.
15. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
16. ARNOLD SHOBER, THE DEMOCRATIC BATTLE OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: OUT OF
MANY, ONE? 74 (2012).
17. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 238
(1991) (holding that school districts that demonstrate compliance with desegregation orders
and show that they will not return to their “former ways” could be released from their
orders).
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desegregation orders.18 After the schools were released from the court orders,
they started to resegregate—they did not reach the levels of segregation
experienced pre-Brown, but absent the influence of the court order,
integration nevertheless decreased. For example, one study determined that
white/black segregation begins to rise within a few years of release from a
court order, and continues to increase for at least ten years.19
Conscious, voluntary integration efforts are also prohibited
following the Court’s 2007 decision in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, in which the Court determined that
“explicit racial classifications” in school assignment plans were
unacceptable.20 Not all public schools, of course, were segregated by law—
known in some contexts as de jure segregation—contrasted with de facto
segregation, through which schools were segregated by circumstance or
private practices.21 However, such “circumstance” includes law, policy, and
politics that contributed to residential racial segregation, which consequently
led to segregated schools.22
For example, housing policies and practices continue to be a barrier
to school integration. Exclusionary zoning remains an obstacle to affordable
housing, leaving neighborhoods segregated by income-level within school
districts.23 A 2012 study found that loosening zoning regulations would
reduce the housing cost gap and narrow the school test-score gap by four to
seven percentiles.24 This segregation will also persist as long as housing costs
make integration cost-prohibitive. Across the 100 largest metropolitan areas,
housing costs an average of 2.4 times as much (or approximately $11,000
more per year) near a “good” public school than near a “low”-performing
public school.25
Most urban schools are in areas of concentrated poverty, where the
majority—sometimes a large majority—are poor.26 High-poverty schools
almost always perform worse than middle-income schools, sometimes by a
huge margin.27 This effect trickles down to the students themselves—middleincome students perform worse in high-poverty schools than they do in
middle-income schools.28 In 2014, 42.62% of students of color attended high18.
19.
20.
21.

Reardon, supra note 7, at 882.
Id. at 899.
551 U.S. 701, 735 (2007).
JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS,
AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 83 (2010).
22. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY
OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017).
23. Id. at 51-54.
24. Jonathan Rothwell, Housing Costs, Zoning, and Access to High-Scoring Schools,
BROOKINGS (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0419_
school_inequality_rothwell.pdf.
25. Id. at 14.
26. RYAN, supra note 21 at 13.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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poverty public schools while only 7.64% of white students attended such
schools.29
Why does this matter? This persistent segregation creates and will
continue to create inequalities within districts. Integrated educational
environments have a hugely positive impact on students’ educational
attainment. A great deal of research supports the notion that low-income
students earn better test scores when enrolled in higher-income schools. For
example, a 2010 study showed that over 5-7 years, low-income students who
attended low-poverty schools significantly outperformed their low-income
peers who attended moderate-income schools on math and reading tests, and
by the end of elementary school had cut the initial achievement gap between
them and their low-poverty peers in half.30 A 2012 study also concluded that
low-income students enrolled in higher-income schools do better on state
exams.31 Furthermore, as Professor Erika Wilson has noted, students who
attend school districts with a disproportionate share of poor and minority
students “do not obtain the positive-peer effects associated with schools that
enroll students from different socioeconomic statuses and races.”32
These benefits also have the potential to be long-lasting. For
example, a 2011 study found that school desegregation and the
accompanying increases in school quality led to significant improvements in
adult attainments for black children born between 1945 and 1968.33
Attending an integrated school had a positive effect on these students’
likelihood of graduating from high school, completing more years of
schooling, attending college, graduating with a four-year degree, and
attending a higher-quality college.34 It also reduced the likelihood that they
would experience poverty or be incarcerated as an adult; at the same time,
desegregation had no corresponding negative impacts on white students.35 In
fact, white students who attend integrated schools incur positive effects as
well; for example, they are more likely to live in integrated neighborhoods
and seek diverse schools for their children.36
29. School Poverty United States, NAT’L EQUITY ATLAS (2016), http://nationalequity
atlas.org/indicators/School_poverty.
30. See HEATHER SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IS SCHOOL POLICY: ECONOMICALLY
INTEGRATIVE HOUSING PROMOTES ACADEMIC SUCCESS IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
MARYLAND 32 (2010).
31. Rothwell, supra note 24.
32. See Erika K. Wilson, The New School Segregation, 102 CORNELL L. REV.139, 187
(2016); see also Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373 (2012).
33. Rucker C. Johnson, Long-Run Impacts of School Desegregation & School Quality
on Adult Attainments, in NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES 16664 (2011).
34. Id. at 18-20.
35. Id. at 20-23, 30-31.
36. See generally Amy Stuart Wells, et al., How Racially Diverse Schools and
Classrooms Can Benefit All Students, CENTURY FOUND. (Feb. 9, 2016), https://tcf.org/
content/report/how-racially-diverse-schools-and-classrooms-can-benefit-all-students/;
Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, How Non-Minority Students Also Benefit from Racially Diverse
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Overall, the problem of school segregation requires holistic solutions
because it is a holistic problem. If we have a system where students are
assigned to go to school based on where they live, we must address the fact
that a complicated web of legal, social, and political factors designates where
people live. However, we must also be mindful that this is the kind of
problem that can look better or worse depending on whether we look at the
composition of school populations across districts, or within districts.
B.

The problem of unequal resources

States and school districts often spend wildly different amounts of
money per pupil. In fiscal year 2015, the national average per-pupil spending
on public elementary and secondary education was $11,392.37 However,
average expenditures ranged from high-average states like New York
($21,206 per pupil) and Massachusetts ($15,592 per pupil) to lower-end
average expenditures in California ($10,467 per pupil) and Florida ($8,881
per pupil).38
Intradistrict spending discrepancies are less pronounced, but in some
instances, schools within a given district do spend more per pupil than
others.39 Before Brown, such disparities were “rampant and followed racial
lines, with all-black schools often funded at much lower levels than all-white
schools.”40 However, even today, “the resource disparities found across
schools within districts are often as large and, in some cases, may be larger
than the more widely recognized disparities across districts.”41
School funding has, of course, been a focus of much litigation, dating
back to the 1970s. During this period, discussions about equality were
focused on getting additional resources for urban schools based on theories
of interdistrict inequality.42 In such cases, litigants suing under individual
state constitutional provisions had mixed results—not all litigants were
successful, and further, even some successful lawsuits had little practical
effect.43 With no foothold at the federal level,44 courts have often been
reluctant to compel specific remedies from school districts and most
Schools, NAT’L COALITION ON SCH. DIVERSITY (Oct. 2012), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/
ED571621.pdf.
37. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUB. EDUC. FIN.: 2015 at 12 (2017), https://www.census.gov
/govs/go/school_govs.html.
38. Id. at 20.
39. RYAN, supra note 21, at 126.
40. Id.
41. Ross Rubenstein et al., Rethinking the Intradistrict Distribution of School Inputs to
Disadvantaged Students 1, 11 (Apr. 2006), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/rubensteinschwartz-stiefel_paper.pdf.
42. RYAN, supra note 21, at 149-51.
43. Almost every state has had such a lawsuit; litigants have won about half. Id. at
145.
44. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (finding no
federal equal protection violation in Texas’s school funding scheme).
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legislatures are unwilling to come up with a solution to a problem they tried
to disavow. Then, plaintiffs have to go back to court to compel action from
the legislature.45
This wave of school funding litigation was concerned with
equalizing funding across districts, not within them. In Serrano v. Priest,46
the California Supreme Court held that California’s school funding system
violated the equal protection provisions of both the federal and state
constitutions.47 The Court found that the state’s funding system, which relied
on a local property tax base, was unlawfully discriminatory because “it
makes the quality of a child’s education a function of the wealth of his parents
and neighbors.”48 The plaintiffs’ victory in Serrano launched a series of
similar challenges to other states’ school funding systems.49
The undergirding principle of Serrano and other school funding
cases was that a school district that spent more per-pupil could provide a
better education than one that spent less per-pupil.50 As a result, most states
attempted to equalize resources across school districts.51 For example, some
states limited what could be collected locally while others provided a baselevel allocation to every district through a combination of state and local
funds.52
Still, equalizing funding disparities among districts does not address
the problem of inequities within school districts. For example, focusing legal
discussions on the disparities among New York school districts did nothing
to offset inequalities within the New York City school district, where at one
time, some individual schools spent over $6,000 more per pupil than other
schools in the city.53 Similarly, even as Texas sought to equalize resources
across districts, there was no consequent effect on spending differences at
schools within districts.54
Of course, the schools that are usually left most wanting are those
most in need. For example, one 2006 report asserted that, ‘‘[d]espite clear
evidence that some students require more resources than others, less money
often flows to schools serving children who need these extra resources
most.’’55
45. RYAN, supra note 21, at 122.
46. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
47. Id. at 1244.
48. Id.
49. RYAN, supra note 21, at 135 (noting that in the two years following Serrano, fiftytwo lawsuits were filed in approximately thirty different states).
50. Id. at 122.
51. MARGUERITE ROZA, EDUCATIONAL ECONOMICS: WHERE DO $CHOOL FUNDS GO? 20
(2010).
52. Id.
53. Marguerite Roza & Paul T. Hill, How Can Anyone Say What’s Adequate if Nobody
Knows How Money Is Spent?, in COURTING FAILURE 235, 246 (Eric A. Hanushek, ed., 2006).
54. Id.
55. THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., FUND THE CHILD: TACKLING INEQUITY AND ANTIQUITY
IN SCHOOL FINANCE 9 (2006).
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Such resources include classroom teachers. Teacher distribution
policies often result in the highest-need students being taught by the least
experienced teachers.56 Newly-minted teachers are not as effective as they
will eventually be; despite this, students in high-poverty and high-minority
schools are disproportionately assigned to new teachers.57 These students are
also more likely to be taught by an out-of-field teacher (one without a major
or minor in the subject).58 One in three core academic classes in high-poverty
secondary schools are taught by out-of-field teachers, whereas this number
is one in five in low-poverty secondary schools.59
Budgeting practices also exacerbate these inequities. For example,
many districts do not consider actual teacher salaries when budgeting for and
reporting each school’s expenditures—instead, they use averages.60 When
the highest-poverty schools are staffed by less-experienced teachers who
typically earn lower salaries, high-poverty schools (who overpay for less
experienced teachers) in effect, end up subsidizing low-poverty schools (who
effectively receive a discount for their more experienced teachers’ salaries).61
Historically, a lack of data regarding individual school spending and
budgeting meant that inequities of this type have not been included in
funding-related legislative debates or litigation.62 A lack of detailed data also
masks information about non-problematic spending differences; for example,
some spending inequalities can be attributed to spending on students in need,
such as students with disabilities.63 In recent years, more school-level data
has become available, and even more may be forthcoming, given the
financial reporting requirements of 2015’s Every Student Succeeds Act.64
Inequities revealed by school-level data could prompt districts to find a way
to equalize spending and other resource distribution within school districts.
In the meantime, resource inequalities may remain untended to if school
finance conversations remain focused on interdistrict inequalities.

56. Heather G. Peske & Katie Haycock, Teaching Inequity: How Poor and Minority
Students Are Shortchanged on Teacher Quality, EDUC. TRUST 2-3 (2006).
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2-3.
60. Id. at 10.
61. CATHERINE BROWN ET AL., HIDDEN MONEY: THE OUTSIZED ROLE OF PARENT
CONTRIBUTIONS IN SCHOOL FINANCE 2 (2017), available at https://www.americanprogress
.org/issues/education-k-12/reports/2017/04/08/428484/hidden-money/ [hereinafter HIDDEN
MONEY].
62. RYAN, supra note 21, at 126.
63. Id. at 127.
64. Every Student Succeeds Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2016) (requiring that districts
publicly report per-pupil spending by school starting in December 2019).
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C.

A growing gap in private fundraising and overall parent
influence

One area where inequality within districts is most starkly apparent is
where home and school associations65 have the ability to raise money to
support a particular school. According to a 2017 report by the Center for
American Progress, schools that serve one-tenth of 1% of American students
collect 10% of the estimated $425 million that home and school associations
raise each year.66
These home and school associations generally support schools with
very low levels of poverty. Almost all of the wealthiest associations come
from schools in which less than one-third of the students were eligible for
free or reduced-price lunches (a commonly-used proxy for the relative wealth
of school families).67 For example, Horace Mann Elementary School in
Washington, DC is one of the most affluent schools in the District. Only 6%
of Horace Mann students come from low-income families.68 In 2014, the
Horace Mann Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) raised over $300,000 in
parent donations and membership dues for future programming.69
This private fundraising gap is widening. According to a 2014 study,
there was a 200% increase the number of home and school associations from
1995-2010; these groups raised $300 million more in 2010 than they did in
1995.70
The effect of these associations’ fundraising and buying power is
real. In 2014, the Horace Mann PTA spent over $470,000 to support
programs at the school.71 Among other things, this money pays for additional
art, music, and physical education teachers and for additional supplies and
materials for classroom teachers.72
Some school districts have attempted to close this gap by placing
restrictions on home and school association spending. For example, the New
York City Department of Education restricts local PTAs from paying for

65. This Essay uses the term “home and school” association to refer to the support
association/organization through which parental involvement in the school takes place. Such
groups are also known as “parent-teacher” or “parent-teacher-student” associations or
organizations.
66. HIDDEN MONEY, supra note 61.
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id., citing Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, Horace
Mann Elementary PTA (2014).
70. Ashlyn Aiko Nelson & Beth Gazley, The Rise of School-Supporting Nonprofits,
ASS’N EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y, 541, 551 (2014), https://aefpweb.org/sites/default
/files/edfp_a_00146.pdf.
71. HIDDEN MONEY, supra note 61, at 8, citing Form 990 Return of Organization
Exempt from Income Tax, Horace Mann Elementary PTA (2014).
72. Id.
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teachers in core subjects such as math, science, English, and history.73
However, such restrictions do not necessarily affect the ultimate amount of
money these groups might raise. A 2017 report from the Center for American
Progress compared parent fundraising in two school districts in Maryland—
Montgomery County and Anne Arundel County—both of which sit just
outside Washington, DC.74 Montgomery County does not allow parent
contributions to influence school staffing, while Anne Arundel County has
no such restriction.75 The two districts are demographically similar, although
Montgomery Country serves twice as many students and Anne Arundel
County is much less racially diverse.76 The spending restriction in
Montgomery County did not appear to have a negative effect on fundraising.
From 2012-2014, fundraising looked similar in the two districts.77 In both
districts, schools serving the most affluent students raised much more money
than those serving high-poverty students, and parents donated a similar share
of their families’ overall budgets.78
Other school districts have also tried to close the fundraising gap by
pooling district-wide donations and distributing them equally to all schools.
For example, the Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School District decided to
do this in 2011.79 The benefit of this decision flowed mostly to the lowerincome schools in the district, which is overall fairly wealthy. Of the eleven
elementary schools in the district, four in Santa Monica qualify for Title I
aid, the federal financial assistance provided to high-poverty schools under
Title I, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.80 In contrast,
Malibu is a much wealthier community with no Title I elementary schools,
although 12% of the Malibu student population qualifies for free or reducedprice lunch.81
The regulation left open an option for parents to make individual
donations designated for certain expenses, including campus beautification,
73. N.Y. CITY DEPT. OF EDUC., REGULATION OF THE CHANCELLOR A660(III)(D)(5)(c)
(2017).
74. HIDDEN MONEY, supra note 61, at 8-10.
75. Id. at 8-9; Montgomery County’s policy states that “funds raised by fund-raising
groups cannot be used to employ anyone to work in the schools during the regular school
day.” Id. (citing School-Related Fund-Rising, BD. EDUC. MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
http://www.montgomeryschoolsmd.org/departments/policy/pdf/cnd.pdf).
76. HIDDEN MONEY, supra note 61, at 9.
77. Id. at 9-10 (stating that according to available data, Montgomery County home and
school associations raised around $70/student while Anne Arundel County’s raised around
$60/student).
78. Id. at 10 (stating that according to available data, the ten most affluent
Montgomery County schools’ home and school associations raised at least $700,000 in 2014
($170/student) while those in Anne Arundel County raised at least $240,000 ($100/student)).
79. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified Sch. Dist., BP 3290, Acceptance of Gifts (2011),
http://www.smmef.org/uploads/BP_3290_Acceptance_of_Gifts.pdf.
80. Dana Goldstein, PTA Gift for Someone Else’s Child? A Touchy Subject in
California, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/08/us/californiapta-fund-raising-inequality.html.
81. Id.
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technology, and field trips.82 However, expenses for items such as teacher
salaries or curricular programs must be handled by the Santa Monica-Malibu
Education Foundation, which redistributes any money raised across all
schools in the district.83 Opponents of the policy feared that the new
regulation would cause a drop in donations, a decrease in enrollment, or a
loss of school programs.84 However, according to Santa Monica-Malibu
Education Foundation data, total donations did not drop in the first few years
under the new policy.85 At the same time, some Malibu parents boycotted the
fund.86 Malibu parents have also responded by seeking to form their own
school district, as discussed infra.87
Proponents of these types of fundraising efforts defend them as an
important part of parent involvement and argue that schools do this type of
fundraising to offset the lack of Title I funding not available to wealthier
schools.88 However, active parent involvement does not only involve
monetary donations. In relation to poor parents, middle-income and affluent
parents are not only more likely to have money to donate to individual
schools, they are also more likely to be active and engaged in the life of the
school—which can be a key factor in school success.89 They are also more

82. Mission & History, SANTA MONICA-MALIBU EDUCATION FOUNDATION (2017),
http://www.smmef.org/about/mission-history.
83. Id. (“In the new model, PTAs and Booster Clubs at each school can fundraise for
equipment, materials and student experiences like field trips and assemblies. Funds for
additional personnel are raised through district-wide fundraising by the Education
Foundation.”).
84. Goldstein, supra note 80; Jason Islas, Santa Monica – Malibu School Board
Approves Controversial Gift Policy, THE LOOKOUT (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.
surfsantamonica.com/ssm_site/the_lookout/news/News-2011/December-2011/12_01_2011
_Santa_Monica_Malibu_School_Board_Approves_Controversial_Gift_Policy.html.
85. Goldstein, supra note 80.
86. Jonathan Friedman, Santa Monica School Board Member Says Malibu Parents
Boycotting Educational Foundation, SANTA MONICA LOOKOUT (May 16, 2016),
https://www.surfsantamonica.com/ssm_site/the_lookout/news/News-2016/May2016/05_16_2016_Santa_Monica_School_Board_Member_Says_Malibu_Parents_Boycotti
ng_Education_Foundation.html.
87. Goldstein, supra note 80; Jonathan Friedman, Santa Monica School Board
Members Support Malibu Split, Questions Remain, SANTA MONICA LOOKOUT (Dec. 2,
2015), https://www.surfsantamonica.com/ssm_site/the_lookout/news/News-2015/December2015/12_02_2015_Santa_Monica_School_Board_Members_Support_Malibu_Split_Questio
ns_Remain.html.
88. See, e.g., Brian M. Rosenthal, As Parents Raise Cash, Schools Confront Big Gap,
SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 28, 2012), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/as-parents-raisecash-schools-confront-big-gap/ (“Members of the PTA-fundraising powerhouses say they
are simply balancing out a public-funding formula that allocates significantly more money to
low-income schools.”); Goldstein, supra note 80 (“Leaders at several overachieving PTAs
also said their generosity addressed another kind of inequality: Their schools did not benefit
from Title I, the federal taxpayer-funded program for schools that serve large numbers of
poor children.”).
89. RYAN, supra note 21, at 169 (“These parents are more likely to set high
expectations for their children, which is then translated into the school’s culture. These
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likely to “monitor” principals and teachers and to complain about subpar
performance—they have “clout” to bring about improvements to the school
and even the district.90 Lower-income schools tend to have lower levels of
parent involvement overall, as well as less overall intradistrict influence.91
This, combined with the fact that urban districts often have less political pull
at the state level, leaves lower-resourced schools with few options to offset
the resource gap.92
Overall, it is difficult to argue that parent support—whether financial
or in some other form—should be stunted. At the same time however, the
fact that varying levels of parent support can contribute to inequalities within
school districts is a concept that should not be ignored.
D.

The ability of school districts to secede

A different type of inequality is related to school district secession.93
After Brown, lower federal courts consistently held that school district
secession was impermissible if the secession would lead to racial
concentration or an imbalance of resources between the new districts.94 In so
doing, the courts thwarted efforts by southern school districts seeking to
avoid compliance with Brown. However, in 1974, the Supreme Court
weakened lower courts’ ability to support desegregation efforts by ruling that
interdistrict integration programs were only permissible in instances where
there had been an interdistrict violation.95 The opinion gave school district
boundaries “near-sacred status.”96
parents, in part because they have more time, are also more likely to volunteer in school, to
attend conferences, and to be involved in parent-teacher organizations.”)
90. Id. at 169.
91. Id. at 14 (“There is not enough pressure within urban districts, from parents, to
ensure that existing resources are used wisely and that expectations remain high for all
students.”).
92. Id. at 14 (“[U]rban districts lack the political muscle on the state and federal levels
to ensure that workable policies are implemented wisely and that they are accompanied by
sufficient resources. The lackluster track record of urban districts also makes them
unsympathetic to many legislators.”).
93. See generally, Wilson, supra note 32.
94. See, e.g., Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 403, 404 (5th Cir. 1971)
(“[W]here the formulation of splinter school districts, albeit validly created under state law,
have the effect of thwarting the implementation of a unitary school system, the district court
may not . . . recognize their creation.”); Lee v. Macon City Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 746, 752
(5th Cir. 1971) (“The city cannot secede from the county where the effect—to say nothing of
the purpose—of secession has a substantial adverse effect on desegregation of the county
school district. If this were legally permissible, there could be incorporated towns for every
white neighborhood in every city.”).
95. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974) (“[T]he n[o]tion that school district
lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to
the history of public education in our country. No single tradition in public education is more
deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools. . . . “).
96. Fractured: The Breakdown of America’s School Districts, EDBUILD 7 (June 2017),
https://edbuild.org/content/fractured/fractured-full-report.pdf.
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A few hundred school systems in the country are still bound by
desegregation court orders that followed Brown.97 These districts are bound
by the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision that the constitutionality of a
municipal secession from a school district under a federal court
desegregation order must be assessed based on the effect of the secession,
not the motivation of the officials behind the secession effort.98
According to a 2017 EdBuild study, at least seventy-one
communities across the country have attempted to withdraw from their
school district since 2000.99 Of these seventy-one, only nine were prevented
from doing so.100 These secession attempts usually occur when a wealthy
community within a school district wants to break away from the existing
district, such as in the Santa Monica-Malibu district discussed supra.
Thirty states currently allow for some form of secession, and some
states make the process much easier than others.101 Of the thirty states that
permit secession, only one requires action by the state legislature and only
four require any action from voters in the district left behind.102 Six states
have laws that require consideration of how the split will affect racial and
socioeconomic diversity or equality of opportunity for groups of students.103
Nine require consideration of the effect on funding,104 while six require that
efficiency be considered.105 Only three states—California, Nebraska, and
Wyoming—require all three of these considerations.106
When permitted, these secessions convert intradistrict inequality
into interdistrict inequality. For example, after a 2013 change to Tennessee
law that now allows school secessions in municipalities with school district
populations of 1,500 or more and the support of a majority of municipal
voters, six wealthy communities broke off from the Shelby County school

97. Yue Qiu & Nikole Hannah-Jones, A National Survey of School Desegregation
Orders, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 23, 2014), http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/desegregationorders.
98. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 464 (1972) (noting that secession
would substantially impede integration because the original school district would be 72%
black and 28% white while the newly created district would be 52% black and 48% white).
99. Fractured, supra note 96 at 6.
100. Id. Forty-seven attempts were successful, six attempts never moved into formal
proceedings, and nine were ongoing at the time of the report. One recently-resolved case of
note involved the Jefferson County School District in Alabama, from which the City of
Gardendale sought to secede. The Eleventh Circuit recently ruled against the secession
attempt and the school district has said it will not appeal. Stout ex rel. Stout v. Jefferson Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 882 F.3d 988 (11th Cir. 2018); Gardendale Will Cease Efforts to Create New
School System, AL.COM (Feb. 28, 2018), http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/
2018/02/gardendale_will_cease_efforts.html.
101. Fractured, supra note 96 at 1, 6.
102. Id. at 13.
103. Id. at 7.
104. Id. at 13.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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district in 2014, leaving behind lower-income schools in Memphis.107 The
new districts have an average student poverty rate of 11%, which is lower
than that of Beverly Hills.108 In contrast, one-third of students in the legacy
district live below the poverty line and the budget in the new district was cut
by 20%.109In the wake of these secessions, the “left behind” districts are
likely to face huge resource deficits, and may find themselves in a deepening
hole because of them. Chief among these is the racial and socioeconomic
segregation that follows the secession of a wealthy community from a larger
district.110 “Departing” districts also frequently “take” infrastructure like
school buildings and teachers, and the left-behind district receives nowhere
near what they need to remain on equal footing to where they stood as part
of the larger district.111 In addition to the lost resources, “left behind” districts
must then deal with increased costs because smaller school districts tend to
have significantly higher administrative costs than larger systems.112 The
remaining district is also likely to encounter a decrease in intangible
resources like political clout. These future interdistrict inequalities are an
outgrowth of intradistrict inequality that incentivizes better-off members of
a community to seek independence and control through secession.
E.

The limitations of school choice

School choice programs, in theory, offer potential relief to students
in districts where such programs exist. However, because of the limitations
on how choices are offered and exercised, they are also a source of potential
inequalities within districts.
Interdistrict school choice plans do not do much to offset inequalities
among districts. They mostly exist “on paper” and are either voluntary or
only require that districts accept out-of-district students when space is
available.113 As a result, very few students—less than 1% of all public school
students—cross district lines to attend public school.114
Under the No Child Left Behind Act, students had the right to
transfer out of “failing” schools—those that did not meet certain assessment

107. Id. at 9.
108. Id. (citing Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(2015), http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/).
109. Fractured, supra note 96, at 9.
110. Id. at 16.
111. Wilson, supra note 32, at 202 (noting that the new school district often pays a
facilities replacement fee that is far less than what the legacy school district considers to be
an adequate amount).
112. See, e.g., Ulrich Boser, Size Matters: A Look At School-District Consolidation,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1, 6 (Aug. 2013), https://www.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/08/SchoolDistrictSize.pdf.
113. RYAN, supra note 21, at 9.
114. Id.
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benchmarks.115 However, the choices were limited to public schools located
in the same district, and effectively left urban students with no choice at all
if they found themselves in a district with few alternatives and no option to
cross district lines into suburban schools.116 Only about 1% of students
executed these transfers.117
Intradistrict choice seems like a natural part of any solution to offset
intradistrict inequalities. Here, I use the term “school choice” to refer to all
options offered by and within a certain school district; this might include
magnet schools or charter schools. However, these options have limitations,
and in some circumstances exacerbate inequalities. Magnet schools and
specialized schools, for example, necessarily have capped enrollments, and
some also require certain levels of academic achievement for students to be
admitted.118 Charter schools are also limited in the amount of seats they can
offer, often resorting to a lottery system to determine enrollment.119 Wellconnected parents or principals may have political power or connections that
can help shape enrollments as well. Overall, introducing the concept of
choice does not mean access is equally available.
Some school districts have attempted to equalize opportunity by
offering access to traditional public schools to all students district-wide.
However, this does not mean that parents and students can or will exercise
choices that will remedy such inequalities. For example, New York City has
centralized and streamlined the high school assignment process. Future high
school students can apply to twelve different high schools through a single
High School Application.120 However, despite this breadth of choice, a 2013
study noted that low-achieving students were more often matched to schools
that were lower-performing than those of all other students.121 This occurred
despite the fact that lower-achieving and higher-achieving students were
equally likely to be matched to their top choice.122 Students were also more
likely to favor schools that are closer to home, and thus, lower-achieving
115. See generally Lance D. Fusarelli, Restricted Choices, Limited Options, 21 EDUC.
POL’Y 132 (2007).
116. RYAN, supra note 21, at 9.
117. Alyson Klein, ESSA Clears Our Underbrush on School Improvement Path, 36
EDUC. WEEK, no. 6, 2016 at 4, 7. See also Fusarelli, supra note 115, at 133.
118. What Are Magnet Schools, MAGNET SCHS. AM. (2017), http://magnet.edu/about/
what-are-magnet-schools#1499667889100-039b81ce-813c; RYAN, supra note 21, at 186-87.
119. Charter Schools FAQ, NAT’L ALLIANCE PUB. CHARTER SCHS. (2018), https://www.
publiccharters.org/about-charter-schools/charter-school-faq.
120. High Sch., N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF EDUC., http://schools.nyc.gov/ChoicesEnrollment/
High/default.htm. This does not include New York’s twelve specialized high schools, which
are more akin to magnet schools. Specialized High Sch., N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://schools.nyc.gov/ChoicesEnrollment/High/specialized/default.htm.
121. Lori Nathanson et. al., High School Choice in New York City: A Report on the
School Choices and Placements of Low-Achieving Students, RES. ALLIANCE FOR N.Y. CITY
SCH. iv (2013), https://steinhardt.nyu.edu/scmsAdmin/media/users/sg158/PDFs/
hs_choice_low_achieving_students/HSChoiceReport.pdf.
122. Id. at 9.
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students were more likely to have an initial choice that was less selective and
lower-performing.123 Choice can open doors, but not every student is equally
likely or able to walk through.
Parents and students also have to know that choices exist before they
can attempt to exercise them. Even with the best of intentions, it is almost
impossible to make sure everyone has equal information about existing
choices.
Often, students who exercise school choice leave low-performing
neighborhood schools for some other option, and the neighborhood schools
are left to deal with consequences such as lower enrollment and allocation of
district resources. Thus, students and families who do not (or cannot) exercise
a choice are left to deal with the resource inequalities left in the wake of those
who do. Choice may create an opportunity for equalization for some, but
ultimately the remaining inequalities are borne by certain students and
families.
II.

FINDING A WAY TO EQUALITY WITHIN DISTRICTS

These five factors, considered separately and then taken together,
demonstrate the complicated web that is intradistrict inequality. Each of these
issues raises questions about inequality within districts; with deeper
consideration comes the realization that there are synergies among these
different concepts. For example, charter schools, a popular choice option,
often lack integrated school populations. In another instance, school
fundraising restrictions in at least one case have led to issues regarding school
secession. There is an interrelationship among these five factors that
exacerbates problems and means that inequalities are likely to grow, in urban
and suburban districts alike.
What is the way forward? This Essay has taken the position that we
must use law, policy, and politics to remedy intradistrict inequalities if we
are going to have meaningful education reform. Solving problems across
districts can leave intradistrict inequalities in place—or, worse, unidentified.
There are many first steps that could be taken. Some involve getting
better information and data so that we can be sure where inequalities lie.
Some involve changing attitudes—about diversity, about resource-sharing,
about community. Some involve district-level practices such as budgeting
procedures, teacher assignments, and private-fundraising. Parents must also
be reassured that the benefits of equality flow in all directions;124 reeducation
is a critical part of the solution to the problem of intradistrict inequality.
School districts must, by will or by force, find a way to resolve these
intradistrict inequalities. To do so will not be easy. However, as John Dewey

123. Id. at 16.
124. RYAN, supra note 21, at 298.
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wrote in 1915, “What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that
must the community want for all of its children.”125

125. JOHN DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY 19 (2d ed. 1915).

